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Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
800,00 DH
Sur commande
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type.
| ISBN / EAN | 9780198845027 |
|---|---|
| Auteur | Epperly, Brad (Assistant Professor of Political Science, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina) |
| Editeur | Oxford University Press |