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Strategic Learning and its Limits

Auteur: Young, H. Peyton (Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford)
Editeur: Oxford University Press
Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing.
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Suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in modern economics. This work discusses interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; and hypothesis testing.
ISBN / EAN 9780199269181
Auteur Young, H. Peyton (Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford)
Editeur Oxford University Press